Launch HN: Tinfoil (YC P25): Verifiable Privacy for Cloud AI

Launch HN: Tinfoil (YC P25): Verifiable Privacy for Cloud AI

Hello HN! We’re Tanya, Sacha, Jules and Nate from Tinfoil: https://tinfoil.sh. We host models and AI workloads on the cloud while guaranteeing zero data access and retention. This lets us run open-source LLMs like Llama, or Deepseek R1 on cloud GPUs without you having to trust us—or any cloud provider—with private data.

Since AI performs better the more context you give it, we think solving AI privacy will unlock more valuable AI applications, just how TLS on the Internet enabled e-commerce to flourish knowing that your credit card info wouldn't be stolen by someone sniffing internet packets.

We come from backgrounds in cryptography, security, and infrastructure. Jules did his PhD in trusted hardware and confidential computing at MIT, and worked with NVIDIA and Microsoft Research on the same, Sacha did his PhD in privacy-preserving cryptography at MIT, Nate worked on privacy tech like Tor, and I (Tanya) was on Cloudflare's cryptography team. We were unsatisfied with band-aid techniques like PII redaction (which is actually undesirable in some cases like AI personal assistants) or “pinky promise” security through legal contracts like DPAs. We wanted a real solution that replaced trust with provable security.

Running models locally or on-prem is an option, but can be expensive and inconvenient. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is not practical for LLM inference for the foreseeable future. The next best option is using secure enclaves: a secure environment on the chip that no other software running on the host machine can access. This lets us perform LLM inference in the cloud while being able to prove that no one, not even Tinfoil or the cloud provider, can access the data. And because these security mechanisms are implemented in hardware, there is minimal performance overhead.

Even though we (Tinfoil) control the host machine, we do not have any visibility into the data processed inside of the enclave. At a high level, a secure enclave is a set of cores that are reserved, isolated, and locked down to create a sectioned off area. Everything that comes out of the enclave is encrypted: memory and network traffic, but also peripheral (PCIe) traffic to other devices such as the GPU. These encryptions are performed using secret keys that are generated inside the enclave during setup, which never leave its boundaries. Additionally, a “hardware root of trust” baked into the chip lets clients check security claims and verify that all security mechanisms are in place.

Up until recently, secure enclaves were only available on CPUs. But NVIDIA confidential computing recently added these hardware-based capabilities to their latest GPUs, making it possible to run GPU-based workloads in a secure enclave.

Here’s how it works in a nutshell:

1. We publish the code that should run inside the secure enclave to Github, as well as a hash of the compiled binary to a transparency log called Sigstore

2. Before sending data to the enclave, the client fetches a signed document from the enclave which includes a hash of the running code signed by the CPU manufacturer. It then verifies the signature with the hardware manufacturer to prove the hardware is genuine. Then the client fetches a hash of the source code from a transparency log (Sigstore) and checks that the hash equals the one we got from the enclave. This lets the client get verifiable proof that the enclave is running the exact code we claim.

3. With the assurance that the enclave environment is what we expect, the client sends its data to the enclave, which travels encrypted (TLS) and is only decrypted inside the enclave.

4. Processing happens entirely within this protected environment. Even an attacker that controls the host machine can’t access this data. We believe making end-to-end verifiability a “first class citizen” is key. Secure enclaves have traditionally been used to remove trust from the cloud provider, not necessarily from the application provider. This is evidenced by confidential VM technologies such as Azure Confidential VM allowing ssh access by the host into the confidential VM. Our goal is to provably remove trust both from ourselves, aka the application provider, as well as the cloud provider.

We encourage you to be skeptical of our privacy claims. Verifiability is our answer. It’s not just us saying it’s private; the hardware and cryptography let you check. Here’s a guide that walks you through the verification process: https://docs.tinfoil.sh/verification/attestation-architectur....

People are using us for analyzing sensitive docs, building copilots for proprietary code, and processing user data in agentic AI applications without the privacy risks that previously blocked cloud AI adoption.

We’re excited to share Tinfoil with HN!

* Try the chat (https://tinfoil.sh/chat): It verifies attestation with an in-browser check. Free, limited messages, $20/month for unlimited messages and additional models

* Use the API (https://tinfoil.sh/inference): OpenAI API compatible interface. $2 / 1M tokens

* Take your existing Docker image and make it end to end confidential by deploying on Tinfoil. Here's a demo of how you could use Tinfoil to run a deepfake detection service that could run securely on people's private videos: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8hLmqoutyk. Note: This feature is not currently self-serve.

* Reach out to us at contact@tinfoil.sh if you want to run a different model or want to deploy a custom application, or if you just want to learn more!

Let us know what you think, we’d love to hear about your experiences and ideas in this space!

Discussion 100 comments · 146 points · FrasiertheLion · 2025-05-15
Open on HN
Loading the discussion…

Domain filters

Stories from these domains are hidden from every list. Subdomains match too: blocking substack.com also hides danluu.substack.com. Type a domain, or paste a link to block its site, and press Enter.

New collection

Delete this collection?

About YAVCHN

YAVCHN is a reader for Hacker News and Lobsters, with articles and discussions in separate windows or Classic pages.

Created by Paul Parks and built with PUDL.

YAVCHN source code on GitHub

Privacy policy · Terms of use

Help

Keyboard

j / k
Move down and up the story list. The arrow keys scroll whatever has focus.
Enter
Read the marked story in the article reader.
[ / ]
Read the story above or below in the list, in the same article reader. Back returns to the story you came from.
p
Pin or unpin the marked story, which keeps it in Pinned.
n / N
Move to the next or previous top-level comment in the window in front.
c
Collapse or expand that comment.
f
Hide or show the story list.
Esc
Close a menu or this help.
Access key m
Go to the menu bar. Most browsers take it with Alt on Windows and Linux, and Safari with Control and Option.
?
Show this help.

Windows

Each story opens in a window holding its article above its discussion; drag the bar between them to share the room differently. A window can be moved by its title bar, resized from any edge, snapped to a half or a corner by dragging it there, maximised, or minimised to the bar at the foot of the page. Use Window > New reader window to open an empty reader, or Story > Open in new reader window to open another reader for the current article. Docked readers keep their articles when you select another story from the sidebar. Minimized readers can be restored and reused for their site. A window's Previous and Next buttons read up and down the list in the same window.

A link in a comment or an article to another Hacker News or Lobsters thread opens that thread in a window too. A link to a single HN comment opens the comment above its replies.

While a story's window is in front, the Story and Discussion menus in the menu bar hold its commands: pinning, Previous and Next story, sorting, collapsing every thread, jumping to the first new comment. Each window also remembers where you were in its article and discussion, so a reload, or Back to a story that Next took you past, finds your place again. Closing a window forgets it.

The whole arrangement lives in the address, so a bookmark or a shared link brings it back, and Back undoes the last change. Moving between Hacker News, Lobsters, their lists, Pinned and Find changes only the list, and leaves the windows open.

The list

The pin at the start of a row keeps the story in Pinned, and the cross at its end hides it. Pinned can be narrowed by words in the title, site or author, by source, and to the stories you haven't opened yet, and ordered by when you pinned them, by points or by comments; the filters are part of the address, so a filtered view can be bookmarked. Scroll past the end of the list to load more. Domain filters, in the View menu, hide every story from a site.

Collections are named lists of stories. Story > Add to collection files the story in front into one or more of them, and the Collections feed shows them all or one at a time; the menu that chooses collections also creates, renames, and deletes them. A note is your own text on a story. Choose Add note in a story's toolbar to write one; it saves as you type. Rows with a note carry the note mark, and the Notes feed lists every noted story and searches the text of your notes.

Browsing view

View > Windowed and View > Classic select the browsing view and save your default in this browser. Window view reuses a reader for each feed. Classic view opens stories and applets as pages. Open as a page is a one-off action that does not change your saved default. Use the Windowed selector to return an article to a window. Direct page links always open as pages.

Applets

The Applets menu in the menu bar holds three tools, each a window of its own. Replies to me takes your Hacker News user name and lists the replies to your last thirty comments and stories, checking again every three minutes while it is open, and marking what is new since you last marked them read. Look up a user opens a profile on Hacker News or Lobsters, with their submissions and recent comments, as a commenter's name in any discussion does; the bar at the top of a profile looks up someone else in the same window, and Back returns to the one before. Who is hiring? filters the posts of HN's monthly hiring threads by the words you type.

They read only what the sites publish to everyone, so none of them asks for a login, and your user name stays in this browser anonymously and is included in retained applet state when signed in.

Find

Find takes any link and lists every time it was submitted to Hacker News and Lobsters, so you can read each discussion of it.

About

YAVCHN never sees your Hacker News or Lobsters login. The discussion is fetched from each site's public API; to vote or reply, follow the link above the discussion, or the arrow beside a comment, to the source's own site. Without a YAVCHN account, your data stays in this browser. When signed in, pins, collections, notes, blocked domains, and retained reading state are stored with your account and synchronized across devices. Hidden stories and layout stay in this browser. The privacy policy has the details.

Open source: github.com/paulmooreparks/yavchn. Built with PUDL.